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Significant Drivers of Growth in Africa
Abstract
We employ bootstrap techniques in a production frontier framework to
provide statistical inference for each component in the decomposition of la-
bor productivity growth, which has essentially been ignored in this literature.
We show that only two of the four components (efficiency changes and hu-
man capital accumulation) have significantly contributed to growth in Africa.
Although physical capital accumulation is the largest force, it is not statis-
tically significant on average. Thus, ignoring statistical significance would
falsely identify physical capital accumulation as a major driver of growth in
Africa when it is not.
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1 Introduction
The overall growth performance of most African countries has been poor compared
to that of other developing countries. In particular, the average annual African per
capita real GDP growth has hardly surpassed two percent, while East Asian coun-
tries, for instance, have been experiencing impressive growth rates in the ranges
of four to eight percent. A number of studies analyze this weak performance. For
instance, in terms of the proximate causes of this slow growth, the literature, em-
ploying the standard growth accounting method, often argues that low total factor
productivity is the main impediment to African growth (see, for example, Ndulu
and O’Connell 1999, 2009, Hoeﬄer 2002, Tahari et al. 2004, Bosworth and Collins
2003, Artadi and Sala-i Martin 2003). Physical and human capital accumulation, on
the other hand, have been identified to facilitate growth in Africa (e.g., Berthelemy
and So¨derling 2001, Tahari et al. 2004). However, their contributions are smaller
compared to that of other developing countries (Ndulu and O’Connell 2009, Sen-
hadji 2000).
Another line of research has relied on regression techniques and find the follow-
ing fundamental causes of the weak African growth record: geographical constraints
in the forms of high transaction costs, lower soil quality and exposure to diseases
(Gallup et al. 1999, Bloom and Sachs 1998, Sachs et al. 1995, Sachs and Warner
1997, Masters and McMillan 2001); bad governance characterized by inappropriate
trade and macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment policies, ineffective policies
towards health and demographic challenges, and policy distortions that favored in-
terest groups (Artadi and Sala-i Martin 2003, Bates 1983, Sachs and Warner 1997,
Easterly and Levine 1997, Ndulu and O’Connell 1999, Collier and Gunning 1999b,
Collier and O’Connell 2008); weak institutional capacity, ethnic fragmentation, con-
flicts and civil wars (Acemoglu et al. 2005, Rodrik et al. 2004, Acemoglu et al. 2001,
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Nunn 2008, Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004, Easterly and Levine 1997, Rodrik 1999, Col-
lier 1999).
In this study, we investigate the sources of productivity growth in Africa by
using a production frontier framework. Noteworthy examples in this line include
Fa¨re et al. (1994), Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2005, HR
hereafter). These and follow-up studies perform a cross-country analysis of labor
productivity growth by decomposing it into different sources (see also Badunenko,
Henderson and Zelenyuk 2008, Badunenko, Henderson and Russell 2013, Badunenko
and Romero-A´vila 2013). Different from these past studies, we maintain that
African countries have access to their own production frontier, not necessarily to
the world production frontier, thus benchmarking African economies against one
another.1 Further, studies that use nonparametric production frontier measure-
ment have largely ignored the issue of statistical inference when identifying the
sources of labor productivity growth. We therefore make use of bootstrap methods
(Simar and Wilson 1999) to provide statistical inference regarding the growth com-
ponents. The only related reference we are aware of is Jeon and Sickles (2004), who
apply the Simar and Wilson (1999) method to test for significance of Malmquist
indices in a cross-country analysis. However, their focus is on environmental factors
and their approach does not analyze the role of either physical or human capital
accumulation.
Our results show that, over the 1970 – 2007 period, only human capital accumu-
lation and efficiency changes have, on average, statistical and significant effects on
African growth. Although physical capital accumulation is the largest component
on average, it is not statistical significant. Therefore, if we were to ignore statistical
1For example, Sickles (2012) advocates for the existence of separate production frontiers. Similarly,
Grosskopf and Self (2006) analyze Southeast Asian economies in isolation from the rest of the
world.
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inference, we would falsely identify physical capital accumulation as a major driver
of economic growth in the region.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the
quadripartite decomposition of productivity growth and the bootstrap procedure
used to conduct inference of the components. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4
presents the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
In this section, we follow the methodology in HR to construct African production
frontier and retrieve efficiency scores of individual countries. More specifically,
we use a nonparametric approach to efficiency measurement, Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA), which rests on assumptions of free disposability to envelope the
data in the smallest convex cone, the upper boundary of which is the “best-practice”
frontier. The distance from an observation to such cone then represents the measure
of technical efficiency. DEA is an approach that allows data to tell where the frontier
lies without specifying the functional form of the technology (see Kneip et al. (1998)
for a proof of consistency for the DEA estimator, as well as Kneip et al. (2008) for
its limiting distribution).
We specify technology to contain four macroeconomic variables: aggregate out-
put and three aggregate inputs—labor, physical capital, and human capital. Let
〈Yit, Kit, Lit, Hit〉, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , represent T observations on these
four variables for each of the N countries. Finally, we adopt a standard approach in
the literature (e.g. Lucas 1988, Klenow and Bils 2000, Hall and Jones 1999) and as-
sume that human capital enters the technology as a multiplicative augmentation of
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physical labor input, so that our NT observations are 〈Yit, Kit, Lˆit〉, t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where Lˆit = LitHit is the amount of labor input measured in effec-
tive units in country i at time t. This labor-augmenting human capital specification
reflects the idea that human capital captures the efficiency units of labour embedded
in raw labour; (see Weil 2008, chapter 6) for a textbook exposition.2
The constant returns to scale technology in period t is constructed by using all
the data up to that point in time as
Tt =

〈
Y, Lˆ,K
〉
∈ ℜ3+ | Y ≤
∑
τ≤t
∑
i
ziτYiτ , Lˆ ≥
∑
τ≤t
∑
i
ziτ Lˆiτ ,
K ≥
∑
τ≤t
∑
i
ziτKiτ , ziτ ≥ 0 ∀ i, τ
 , (1)
where ziτ are the activity levels.
The Farrell (output-based) efficiency score for country i at time t is defined by
e(Yit, Lˆit, Kit) = min
{
λ |
〈
Yit/λ, Lˆit, Kit
〉
∈ Tt
}
. (2)
This score is the inverse of the maximal proportional amount that output Yit can be
expanded while remaining technologically feasible, given the technology and input
quantities. It is less than or equal to unity and takes the value of unity if and only
if the it observation is on the period-t production frontier. In our special case of
a scalar output, the output-based efficiency score is simply the ratio of actual to
potential output evaluated at the actual input quantities.
2An alternative specification is the human-capital augmented Solow model where human capital
enters the production function as an additional ordinary input, next to physical capital and raw
labor (Mankiw et al. 1992). However, this type of formulation is not micro-founded (see Acemoglu
2009, chap. 3 and chap. 10 for a discussion on this issue).
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2.2 Quadripartite Decomposition
We again follow the approach of HR to decompose productivity growth into com-
ponents attributable to (1) changes in efficiency (technological catch-up), (2) tech-
nological change, (3) capital deepening (increases in the capital-labor ratio), and
(4) human capital accumulation. Under the constant returns to scale assumption
we construct the production frontiers in the yˆ × kˆ space, where yˆ = Y/Lˆ and
kˆ = K/Lˆ are the ratios of output and capital, respectively, to effective labor. Let-
ting b and c stand for the base period and current period respectively, the potential
outputs per effective unit of labor in the two periods are defined by yb(kˆb) = yˆb/eb
and yc(kˆc) = yˆc/ec, where eb and ec are the values of the efficiency scores in the
respective periods as calculated in Eq. (2) above. Hence,
yˆc
yˆb
=
ec
eb
·
yc(kˆc)
yb(kˆb)
. (3)
Let k˜c = Kc/(LcHb) denote the ratio of capital to labor measured in effective
units under the counterfactual assumption that human capital had not changed from
its base period and k˜b = Kb/(LbHc) the ratio of capital to labor measured in effective
units under the counterfactual assumption that human capital were equal to its
current-period level. Then yb(k˜c) and yc(k˜b) are the potential output per effective
unit of labor at k˜c and k˜b using the base-period and current-period technologies,
respectively. By multiplying the numerator and denominator of Eq. (3) alternatively
by yb(kˆc)yb(k˜c) and yc(kˆb)yc(k˜b), we obtain two alternative decompositions of the
growth of yˆ
yˆc
yˆb
=
ec
eb
·
yc(kˆc)
yb(kˆc)
·
yb(k˜c)
yb(kˆb)
·
yb(kˆc)
yb(k˜c)
, (4)
and
yˆc
yˆb
=
ec
eb
·
yc(kˆb)
yb(kˆb)
·
yc(kˆc)
yc(k˜b)
·
yc(k˜b)
yc(kˆb)
. (5)
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The growth of productivity, yt = Yt/Lt, can be decomposed into the growth of
output per effective unit of labor and the growth of human capital, as follows:
yc
yb
=
Hc
Hb
·
yˆc
yˆb
. (6)
Combining Eq. (4) and (5) with (6), we obtain
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
·
yc(kˆc)
yb(kˆc)
·
yb(k˜c)
yb(kˆb)
·
[
yb(kˆc)
yb(k˜c)
·
Hc
Hb
]
(7)
≡ EFF × TECHc ×KACCb ×HACCb,
and
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
·
yc(kˆb)
yb(kˆb)
·
yc(kˆc)
yc(k˜b)
·
[
yc(k˜b)
yc(kˆb)
·
Hc
Hb
]
(8)
≡ EFF × TECHb ×KACCc ×HACCc.
Eq. (7) and (8) decompose the growth of labor productivity in the two periods
into changes in efficiency, technology, the capital-labor ratio, and human capital
accumulation. The decomposition in Eq. (4) measures technological change by the
shift in the frontier in the output direction at the current-period capital to effective
labor ratio, whereas the decomposition in Eq. (5) measures technological change by
the shift in the frontier in the output direction at the base-period capital to effective
labor ratio. Similarly, Eq. (7) measures the effect of physical and human capital
accumulation along the base-period frontier, whereas Eq. (8) measures the effect of
physical and human capital accumulation along the current-period frontier.
These two decompositions do not yield the same results unless the technology
is Hicks neutral. In other words, the decomposition is path dependent. This ambi-
guity is resolved by adopting the “Fisher Ideal” decomposition, based on geometric
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averages of the two measures of the effects of technological change, capital deepen-
ing and human capital accumulation and obtained mechanically by multiplying the
numerator and denominator of Eq. (3) by
(
yb(kˆc)yb(k˜c)
)1/2 (
yc(kˆb)yc(k˜b)
)1/2
:
yc
yb
= EFF × (TECHb · TECHc)
1/2 × (KACCb ·KACCc)
1/2 × (HACCb ·HACCc)
1/2
≡ EFF × TECH ×KACC ×HACC. (9)
2.3 Statistical inference
One major issue with the approach of HR and others in this line of research is that
it ignores the issue of statistical significance of the components of labor produc-
tivity growth. Indeed, the individual and average components found in HR and
related papers are point estimates; ÊFF , ̂TECH , ̂KACC, and ̂HACC in Eq. (9)
are calculated using the efficiency scores that are measured relative to the finite
sample DEA estimate of the true and unobserved frontier. Using the finite sam-
ple estimate implies that the efficiency scores and consequently the components of
the quadripartite decomposition are subject to sampling variation of the estimated
frontier.
Simar and Wilson (1998) were the first to use bootstrap methods to analyze the
sensitivity of efficiency scores relative to such sampling variations. Simar andWilson
(1999) furthered this idea to estimate the sampling distribution and confidence
intervals for Malmquist productivity indices (a measure of productivity change) and
its components. We employ a smoothed bootstrap procedure to provide statistical
inference on the components of the quadripartite decomposition.
We first apply the DEA estimator introduced in Eq. (2) to the original observed
samples in base (Sb) and current (Sc) time periods, Sb =
〈
Yib, Lˆib, Kib
〉N
i=1
and
Sc =
〈
Yic, Lˆic, Kic
〉N
i=1
under the technology defined in Eq. (1) to obtain estimates
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of the efficiency scores Eb = 〈êib〉
N
i=1 and Ec = 〈êic〉
N
i=1. We then calculate the
potential outputs per effective units of labor that appear in Eq. (7) and (8) and
compute the four components of the decomposition in Eq. (9): ÊFF , ̂TECH ,̂KACC, and ̂HACC.
Providing statistical inference on these components involves generating boot-
strap samples in base (S∗b ) and current (S
∗
c ) time periods. Simar and Wilson (1998)
have shown that the na¨ıve bootstrap, i.e. sampling from the empirical distribution
of the data Sb and Sc, or equivalently from the efficiency scores, Ebc = [Eb Ec], will
yield inconsistent results because the efficiency score is truncated at one. Using the
reflection method and the smoothed bootstrap results in consistent estimation of
confidence intervals (see Silverman 1986). We discuss both the reflection and the
smoothing techniques in the bivariate (two periods) case in greater detail below.
2.3.1 Bivariate kernel density estimation of efficiency scores
LetEbci be the ith row of the (N×2) matrixEbc, the columns of which being Eb and
Ec. Given sample realizations, Ebc = {Ebc1,Ebc2, . . . ,EbcN}
′, from a population
with unknown bivariate density f , a bivariate nonparametric estimate of the joint
density that accounts for the possibility of the temporal correlation of Ebc is given
by
fˆ (ebc, h) =
1
Nh2
N∑
i=1
Kh (Ebci, ebc) , (10)
where ebc = [eb ec] is of dimension (1× 2), Kh(·, ·) is the bivariate kernel function
and bandwidth h is the smoothing parameter (e.g., see Henderson and Parmeter
(2014)). As a kernel function Kh(·, ·), one might use different choices for the bi-
variate (i) non-negative, (ii) radially symmetric, (iii) unimodal probability density
function that integrates to one. We use the standard bivariate normal density
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function that is scaled to have the same covariance matrix as the data
Kh (V U i, vu) =
1
2πσ̂vσ̂u
√
1− ρ̂2vu
exp
{
−
1
2h2 (1− ρ̂2vu)
[(
Vi − v
σ̂v
)2
−
−2ρ̂vu
(Vi − v)
σ̂v
(Ui − u)
σ̂u
+
(
Ui − u
σ̂u
)2]}
, (11)
where vu = [v u] is of dimension (1× 2), V U = [V U ] is a (N × 2) matrix that
has vectors V and U as its columns, ρ̂vu is the estimated correlation coefficient
of V and U , and σ̂2v and σ̂
2
v are the estimated variances of V and U . We use a
single smoothing parameter h = N−1/6 as a bandwidth for the bivariate data since
we scale the kernel function to have the same covariance matrix as the estimated
covariance matrix of the original data (see Silverman 1986, p. 86–87). Since the
DEA efficiency scores are truncated at one, the density estimate using Eq. (10)
will be inconsistent and asymptotically biased. In the univariate case (e.g. where
we have the base period only), this truncation can be overcome by reflecting the
truncated data points {eib}
N
i=1 in the boundary (i.e. about one), {2 − eib}
N
i=1, and
estimating the density using the resulting set of 2N data points, {eib 2−eib}
N
i=1 (see
Silverman 1986, p. 29–32). However, we have a bivariate case and hence there are
two truncations, in base and current periods, which yield different combinations of
the reflections
E
R
bc =

Eb Ec
2−Eb 2−Ec
2−Eb Ec
Eb 2−Ec

. (12)
The estimated covariance matrix of the columns of Ebc (as well as of the reflected
data, [2−Eb 2−Ec]) is defined as
Σ̂ =
 σ̂2b σ̂bc
σ̂bc σ̂
2
c
 , (13)
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which measures the time correlation of the efficiency scores in the two periods. The
estimated covariance matrix of [2−Eb Ec] and [Eb 2−Ec] is given by
Σ̂
R
=
 σ̂2b −σ̂bc
−σ̂bc σ̂
2
c
 . (14)
Let ERbcj be the jth row of the (4N×2) matrix E
R
bc. The bivariate nonparametric
estimate of the joint density of the 4N reflected data points of ERbc is given by
ĝ(ebc, h) =
1
4Nh2
[
2N∑
j=1
Kh
(
E
R
bcj, ebc
)
+
4N∑
j=2N+1
Kh
(
E
R
bcj, ebc
)]
. (15)
Note that the estimate in Eq. (15) is the additive kernel estimate, where the first
term is the bivariate normal density function with the estimated covariance matrix
Σ̂ and the second term is the bivariate normal density function with the estimated
covariance matrix Σ̂
R
. More specifically, the correlation coefficient in Eq. (11)
is defined as: ρ̂vu = σ̂bc/σ̂bσ̂c for j = 1, . . . , 2N and ρ̂vu = −σ̂bc/σ̂bσ̂c for j =
2N + 1, . . . , 4N . The consistent estimate of the density of the original data Ebc is
given by
ĝ∗(ebc, h) =

4ĝ(ebc, h), for eb ≤ 1, ec ≤ 1
0, otherwise
. (16)
2.3.2 Smoothed bootstrap
We do not actually have to estimate the density in (16). The following smoothed
bootstrap procedure can be applied to simulate from the density estimates (see
Silverman 1986, p. 142–144). Draw E1bc = [e
1
ib e
1
ic] (i = 1, . . . , N) randomly with
replacement from ERbc where each row is drawn with equal probability.
3 Then
3Note that E1bc is (N × 2), whereas E
R
bc is (4N × 2).
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compute the (N × 2) matrix
E
2
bc = E¯
1
bc +
(
E
1
bc − E¯
1
bc + hǫ
∗
)
/
(
1 + h2
)1/2
, (17)
where E¯
1
bc is a (N × 2) matrix in which the elements of the first (second) column
are the mean of the first (second) column of E1bc and ǫ
∗ is the (N × 2) matrix
of deviates from the bivariate normal distribution with the estimated covariance
matrix Σ̂ (Σ̂
R
) for the rows of E2bc that were drawn from [Eb Ec] or [2−Eb 2−Ec]
([Eb 2−Ec] or [2−Eb Ec]). Drawing random deviates ǫ
∗ = [ǫ∗1 ǫ
∗
2] from a bivariate
normal density with the estimated covariance matrix Σ̂ can be done using the Box-
Muller method. First, draw ǫ1 and ǫ2 from the univariate normal distribution and
form a (1× 2) matrix ǫ = [ǫ1 ǫ2]. Then use the Cholesky decomposition to obtain
an upper triangular matrix C by decomposing the matrix Σ̂. Then the matrix
ǫ∗ = [ǫ∗1 ǫ
∗
2] = ǫC ∼ N
(
0, Σ̂
)
. Similarly, ǫ∗ = [ǫ∗1 ǫ
∗
2] = ǫC
R ∼ N
(
0, Σ̂
R
)
, where
C
R is the upper triangular Cholesky decomposed matrix Σ̂
R
. Matrix E∗bc = [e
∗
ib e
∗
ic]
(i = 1, . . . , N) contains simulated efficiency scores that are set as follows:
e∗ij =

e2ij , if e
2
ij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , N, j = b, c
2− e2ij , otherwise
, (18)
where e2ij are the elements of E
2
bc. The bootstrap samples in the base, (S
∗
b ), and
current, (S∗c ), time periods can then be constructed as
S∗b =
〈
Y ∗ib = Yib
êib
e∗ib
, Lˆ∗ib = Lˆib, K
∗
ib = Kib
〉N
i=1
(19)
and
S∗c =
〈
Y ∗ic = Yic
êic
e∗ic
, Lˆ∗ic = Lˆic, K
∗
ic = Kic
〉N
i=1
. (20)
The steps of generating the bootstrap samples are summarized as follows:
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1. Sample uniformly with replacement a vector ii of the size N from the integers
1 : 4N .
2. Define E1bc, the rows of which are iith rows of E
R
bc. Calculate E¯
1
bc.
3. Draw the (N × 2) matrix ǫ = [ǫ1 ǫ2] randomly from a standard normal den-
sity. Obtain the (N × 2) matrix ǫ∗ as follows:
ǫ
∗ =

ǫC, for ii ≤ 2N
ǫC
R, otherwise
. (21)
4. Calculate matrix E2bc using Eq. (17), where h = N
−1/6.
5. Calculate matrix E∗bc using Eq. (18).
6. Construct bootstrap samples S∗b and S
∗
c using Eq. (19) and (20).
For the given bootstrap samples construct the technologies:
T ∗t =

〈
Y ∗t , Lˆ
∗
t , K
∗
t
〉
∈ ℜ3+ | Y
∗
t ≤
∑
i
z∗i Y
∗
it , Lˆ
∗
t ≥
∑
i
z∗i Lˆ
∗
it,
K∗t ≥
∑
i
z∗iK
∗
it, z
∗
i ≥ 0 ∀ i
 , t = b, c. (22)
Compute the potential outputs per effective units of labor that appear in Eq. (7) and
(8) using the bootstrap base- and current-period technologies defined in Eq. (22) and
then calculate the bootstrap components of the decomposition in Eq. (9). Apply
the procedure above B times (B should be large in practice) to obtain B bootstrap
components, ÊFF
∗
, ̂TECH∗, ̂KACC∗, and ̂HACC∗.
2.3.3 Confidence intervals
Let Zi denote component EFFi, Ẑi denote ÊFF i and Ẑ
∗
i denote ÊFF
∗
i for a
country i, i = 1, . . . , N . For an unknown distribution of
(
Ẑi − Zi
)
, construction of
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the (1− α)-percent confidence interval boils down to finding values aiα and biα in
Prob
(
−biα ≤ Ẑi − Zi ≤ −aiα
)
= 1− α. (23)
Using B bootstrap values Ẑ∗i we can find a
∗
iα and b
∗
iα such that the probability that
the equation
Prob
(
−b∗iα ≤ Ẑ
∗
i − Ẑi ≤ −a
∗
iα|Sb, Sc
)
= 1− α (24)
holds approaches one as B → ∞. Since the bootstrap involves approximating the
unknown distribution of
(
Ẑi − Zi
)
by that of
(
Ẑ∗i − Ẑi
)
conditional on original
samples Sb and Sc, we can substitute aiα and biα in Eq. (23) with a
∗
iα and b
∗
iα to
obtain the bootstrap approximation based on the original sample as follows
Prob
(
−b∗iα ≤ Ẑi − Zi ≤ −a
∗
iα|Sb, Sc
)
≈ 1− α. (25)
This relationship allows us to construct the approximated (1− α)-percent confi-
dence interval as
Ẑi + a
∗
iα ≤ Zi ≤ Ẑi + b
∗
iα. (26)
The efficiency change for country i is said to be statistically significant (i.e., sig-
nificantly different from zero) if Zi is statistically different from one or when the
confidence interval in Eq. (26) does not include one. The statistical inference with
respect to the remaining components of the decomposition in Eq. (9) for country i
is made by subsequently letting Zi denote TECHi, KACCi, or HACCi and looking
whether the respective confidence interval (26) covers unity.4
4Note that the statistical inference that we have discussed here is provided with respect to each
component for each country in the decomposition (9).
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3 Data
We obtain data for 35 African countries for the period 1970 – 2007 from the Penn
World Tables, Version 6.3 (see Heston et al. 2009). The number of workers is
obtained as RGDPCH * POP/RGDPWOK, where RGDPCH is per capita GDP
computed via the chain method, POP is the population and RGDPWOK is real
GDP per worker. The measure of output is calculated as RGDPWOK multiplied
by the number of workers; the resulting output is in 2005 international dollars.
Real aggregate investment in 2005 international dollars is computed as RGDPL
* POP * KI, where RDGPL is the real GDP computed via the Laspeyres index,
and KI is the investment share of real GDP. We apply the perpetual inventory
method (PIM) to the real investment series to construct the physical capital stock.
More specifically, the current capital stock is the sum of the current investment and
depreciated capital stock from the previous period. Following standard practice,
we compute the initial capital stock, K0, as I0/(g + δ), where I0 is the value of
the investment series in the first year it is available, and g is the average geometric
growth rate for the investment series between the first year with available data and
1980 (Caselli and Feyrer (2007)).
For human capital, we employ the Barro and Lee (2010) education data set. The
data are available every five years and we employ a linear interpolation method to
obtain values in-between.5 We follow HR and adopt the Hall and Jones (1999) con-
struction of human capital. However, instead of using the Psacharopoulos (1994)
survey of wage equations to evaluate the returns to education, we use estimates
reported by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) who provide a more comprehen-
sive study of the returns to education in Africa. Table A1 of Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos (2004) provides country specific returns to education for various African
economies at different years. In Table 1, we show only the returns to education
5These education data are an update of widely used previous compilation of Barro and Lee (2001).
14
that were found in case studies for African economies. To make unified and general
conclusions, we average the returns for each level of education for the African coun-
tries given in their table and apply them to all countries in our sample to construct
our human capital measure. Specifically, let ǫjt represents the average number of
years of education of the adult population in country j at time t and define labor
in efficiency units in country j at time t by
Lˆjt = HjtLjt = h(ǫjt)Ljt = exp
φ(ǫjt) Ljt, (27)
where φ is a piecewise linear function, with a zero intercept and a slope of 0.266
through the sixth year of education, 0.173 for the next six years, and 0.113 for
education beyond the twelfth year (see the last line in Table 1).6 Clearly, the rate
of return to education (where φ is differentiable) is
∂ ln h(ǫjt)
∂ǫjt
= φ′(ǫjt) (28)
and h(0) = 1.
6Whereas these estimates are in line with the standard finding of diminishing returns to education,
an anonymous referee pointed out the work of Colclough et al. (2009) suggesting that this pattern
may have changed in recent years in developing countries. In particular, the authors argue that
the returns to primary education may have decreased in these countries, due to both demand and
supply side factors. On the other hand, they show that the rates of return to secondary and higher
education have increased in recent years in a number of developing countries. If we were to employ
higher returns to education, it is likely that the results would show even larger contributions from
human capital.
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Table 1: Returns to education*
Country Year of study Type of education
Primary Secondary Higher
Botswana 1983 42.0 41.0 15.0
Ethiopia 1972 20.3 18.7 9.7
Ghana 1967 18.0 13.0 16.5
Kenya 1980 10.0
Lesotho 1980 10.7 18.6 10.2
Liberia 1983 41.0 17.0 8.0
Malawi 1982 14.7 15.2 11.5
Morocco 1970 50.5 10.0 13.0
Nigeria 1966 23.0 12.8 17.0
Senegal 1985 23.0 8.9
Sierra Leone 1971 20.0 22.0 9.5
Somalia 1983 20.6 10.4 19.9
South Africa 1980 22.1 17.7 11.8
Sudan 1974 8.0 4.0
Tanzania 1982 5.0
Uganda 1965 66.0 28.6 12.0
Zambia 1983 5.7
Zimbabwe 1987 11.2 47.6 -4.3
The Gambia 1997 33.5 12.1
Burkina Faso 1982 20.1 14.9 21.3
Ethiopia 1996 14.9 14.4 11.9
Average 26.6 17.3 11.3
* Source: Table A1 of Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004)
4 (In)significant results
Here we present our main results. First, we look for significance of the average
estimates, both weighted and unweighted, from the decomposition. Second, we
focus on the estimates for specific countries and pay attention to countries that
deviate from average behavior. Third, since we believe that African countries belong
to a different frontier than the rest of the world, we perform the same analysis for
other otherwise homogeneous economic groups such as OECD, Latin America, and
Asia for the same time period.
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The samples which we employ in our analysis are relatively small and may seem
to be rather ‘non-random’ (which is a violation of the assumption used to prove
that the bootstrap procedure is consistent). Even though we have virtually all
the countries from the African continent, we mean randomness not as that of the
observations, but rather in the sense of current realization resulting from potentially
infinite number of possible outcomes.7
4.1 Average estimates
The final two lines of Table 2 list two measures of average results across the 35
economies. In particular, the row labeled “Average” is the simple arithmetic av-
erage of individual estimates whereas the “Weighted Average” weights each of the
estimates by their relative 2007 output, similar to Zelenyuk (2011).
The average productivity growth in Africa over the 1970-2007 period is 54%.
While this number may not seem small, it is markedly low compared to that achieved
by fast growing economies. For instance, the 54% average African productivity
growth is nearly four times as large for Ireland (208%) and nearly twenty times as
large for China (1120%) over the same time frame. In annual terms, the average
productivity growth in Africa was a mere 1.17%.8 Over the same time period, the
average annual growth rates for OECD, Latin American, Asian, and East Asian
economies are 1.90, 0.56, 3.21, and 4.50%, respectively.9
7We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
8Note that this is a crude approximation of the average productivity evolution over the entire
period on a yearly basis under the assumption of constant productivity growth.
9Note that the confidence bounds cannot be provided for productivity measures since they are
actual data points, not point estimates.
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The average EFF , TECH , KACC, and HACC components are −38.21, 1.53,
67.35 and 60.19%, respectively.10
Inefficiency has regressed African growth whereas technological change is essen-
tially nonexistent. Moreover, ignoring statistical significance,11 these results suggest
that capital deepening is the primary driver of labor productivity growth in Africa
followed by human capital accumulation.
Among the four components, however, only efficiency changes and human capital
accumulation are statistically significant on average.12 Thus, if we ignore statistical
inference, we would falsely conclude that the physical capital accumulation is the
major driving force behind productivity growth.
The weighted averages, ignoring statistical significance, show that human capi-
tal accumulation plays a larger role than physical capital accumulation. This result
implies that relatively larger economies (in 2007) have benefited more from human
capital accumulation. In any case, we still see that the contribution of physical cap-
ital accumulation and technology changes are statistically insignificant on average
whereas efficiency losses significantly reduce growth and human capital accumula-
tion significantly encourages growth in Africa.
10Percentages are obtained by subtracting 1 from the index and multiplying by 100. Because of
compounding, the average contributions of individual components do not, of course, sum to the
average productivity change.
11We note that bootstrap techniques have been applied for inference regarding aggregate efficiencies
of countries (see Henderson and Zelenyuk 2007), but not with respect to the components of
decomposition.
12Delgado et al. (forthcoming) find an insignificant impact of human capital in growth regressions.
Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2014) find much lower (and sometimes insignificant) impacts of human
capital accumulation on growth. Our finding may imply that the production function framework
is a better way to capture the empirical impact of human capital accumulation.
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The positive and significant effect of human capital may capture the direct as
well as the indirect beneficial impacts that this factor brings to growth. For instance,
Weir and Knight (2000) presents evidence showing that educated farmers help to im-
prove the productivity of their non-educated counterparts in rural Ethiopia. In the
same way, Keller (2006) presents cross-country empirical evidence showing several
benefits of education, including lowering fertility, attracting investment in physical
capital and improving political rights.
The insignificance of physical capital can have several roots. For instance, it
may be related to the high cost of investment in Africa.13 Artadi and Sala-i Martin
(2003) argue that the relative prices of investment (to consumption) goods are about
50 percentage points larger in Africa than in East Asian and OECD countries (120
versus 70%). As such, the value of the capital stock constructed by the researcher,
from observed investment data, will overstate the productive capital stock. In line
with this reasoning, Artadi and Sala-i Martin (2003) claim that African growth
would have benefited from an additional yearly 0.44 percentage point if its relative
price of investment goods were the same as those of the OECD countries. In the
same way, the value of the public capital stock in developing countries does not
necessarily reflect its public investment cumulated at cost (Pritchett 2000). Further,
if government investment spending has created little useful capital, its contribution
to productivity growth will likely be insignificant. This is certainty the case when
public investment is more motivated by rent-seeking and political considerations
(Keefer and Knack 2007). The lack of basic education that characterized many
African countries in the 1960s and 1980s (for the indirect effects of education in
contributing to less political instability, to democratization, to reduced fertility
13Much of African investment goods are imported from abroad such that their high value pre-
sumably reflects high taxation and transportation cost as well as the monopoly power of the few
domestic importing firms.
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rates and slower population growth) could be another potential explanation of the
insignificant role of physical capital accumulation.
Finally, public investment will create little productive capital if the government
does not plan (well) how this spending is financed. For instance, during the com-
modity booms of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s many African countries initiated large
scale investment projects of long-term maturities, expecting that the booms will
last forever. When the booms ended some of these ongoing projects were simply
suspended and other were financed with foreign borrowing which later caused the
sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s (Collier and Gunning 2008).
In line with the above explanations, our estimates of efficiency changes may
capture the inefficiency of African economies in converting their investment into
productive capital stock (Pritchett 2000).
Policy choices also mater for the quality of private investment. For instance,
in an environment where the government levies excessive taxes to finance favour
groups, economic agents will allocate a higher share of resources to low productive
non taxable activities (Adam and O’Connell 1999, Bates 1983, Collier and Gunning
1999a). This bad redistributive norm is likely to occur more in autocratic regimes
compared to democratic ones. It will generate more unproductive physical capital,
but also an inefficient resource allocation. The majority of African countries have
been characterized by autocratic regimes from 1973-1994 (Ndulu and O’Connell
1999). In the same way, the development strategy followed by the majority of
African countries in the 1970s and 1980s that relies on nationalization policies and
excessive spending may explain the weak contributions of physical capital and tech-
nology as well as the loss in efficiency in these economies. Civil wars and armed
conflicts that were common in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s are also other potential
explanations of these outcomes (Collier 1999).
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Finally, the characterization of the African inefficiency may be related to some
persistent factors. These include, but are not limited to, genetic diversity recently
(Ashraf and Galor (2013)), low soil quality due to tropical climates (Bloom and
Sachs 1998), the slave trade (Nunn 2008), and kinship sharing that discourages
effort (Platteau 2009) and encourages a misallocation of resources (Baland et al.
2011).
4.2 Individual estimates
Many of the individual results reported in Table 2 mimic the averages. First, most
HACC components are positive and significant. Second, virtually all technology
components are near zero and none are statistically significant. In particular, we
find very small changes in technology across the countries and none of them are
significant. In fact, only 11 countries have components (numerically) different from
zero. This result is perhaps expected as HR and others have shown that there is
little to no technological improvement for Africa. The difference here is that we are
able to show this with statistical evidence.
Third, the majority of efficiency components are negative and statistically signif-
icant. Only, Malawi and Mauritius display positive and significant efficiency com-
ponents. Fourth, although most KACC are insignificant, we find several (8/35)
which are positive and significant: Botswana, Egypt, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mau-
ritius, Sudan, and Swaziland. Combining with significant results on efficiency, these
amount to a total of nine (country) observations, which differ from the average re-
sults, that we will now discuss. In doing so, we rely on the existing literature on
these countries where we relate our results to those reported in the literature. That
being said, a complete country level analysis (for any given country) is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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4.2.1 Mauritius
Among the nine observations, Mauritius distinguishes itself from the rest for having
both positive and statistically significant physical capital and efficiency components
(see columns 3 and 5 of Table 2). This finding is consistent with the widely held
view that Mauritius is a success story (Sachs et al. 1995, Sachs and Warner 1997,
Subramanian and Roy 2001, Subramanian 2009, Frankel 2010).
Like most African resource poor countries Mauritius, was a commodity depen-
dent economy in the 1960s and sugar was the main driver of real activity in the
country. This single good based economy made the country vulnerable to trade and
rainfall shocks. During the same period Mauritius faced other challenges including
rapid population growth, huge unemployment, and political and ethnic conflicts.
These weak initial conditions led some economists to ponder whether or not that
country would fail to develop (Meade 1961). In 1963 Mauritius adopted the popular
industrialization strategy based on Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). One
key difference was that the private sector remained the main actor of the Mauritius
production sector whereas the implementation of ISI in other African countries was
supported by a large amount of nationalizations. However, this first attempt to di-
versify the Mauritius economy did not bring impressive growth certainly in part due
to instabilities related to political and ethnic conflicts that were ongoing (Nath and
Madhoo 2008). The real success of Mauritius occurred after it gained independence
from the British in 1968. Following this event, the country developed political and
market institutions that facilitated sustained growth (Subramanian 2009, Frankel
2010). The political institutions involved a parliamentarian system with an open
competition in elections and a voice for minority ethnic groups, no ruling elite and
power sharing in ministry cabinets, and a limited role for the army. The market
institutions included private property rights and institutions that encouraged con-
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tracts. The results reported in the third column of Table 2 capture these effects
where we find that Mauritius has the largest efficiency component.
In addition, Mauritius made a number of important economic policy choices.
First, the government established an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) that has been
the driver for manufacturing export and FDI which encouraged technology transfer
and knowledge spill-over. Second, investment in human and physical capital as well
as prudent exchange rate policies ensured that the manufacturing sector remains
competitive (Nath and Madhoo 2008). Third, the successive governments have
often implemented appropriate adjustment and stabilization policies as well as good
decisions in international trade agreements. For instance, whereas the majority of
African countries had difficulties in adjusting to the commodity price shocks of the
1970s and 1980s, Mauritius made successful stabilization policies and recovered fast
from these shocks (Gulhati and Nallari 1990). In the same way, Mauritius accepted
in the early 1970s a trade deal which involved a higher export quota of sugar to the
EU but at a lower EU domestic price whereas other developing countries signed an
agreement for selling at the then higher world sugar price but with a limited quota
(Subramanian 2009). Afterwards, the choice of Mauritius proved to be better as
the world commodity prices collapsed but the EU domestic price increased due to
subsidized policies. All these policies probably contribute to explain the positive
role of the four components to labour productivity growth. However, technology
change is not statistically significant (see the entry 19 in Table 2). We will return
to this in Section 4.3.
4.2.2 Cote d’Ivoire
The Mauritius growth promoting policy choices and institutional framework con-
trast with those of poor performers in Table 2. Cote d’Ivoire is similar to Mauritius
in that it does not have many natural resources and has costal access (Collier and
23
O’Connell 2008), but also Cote d’Ivoire was considered as a successful African story
in the 1960s and 1970s (IBRD 1970, Den Tuinder 1978, Hecht 1983). In particular,
Cote d’Ivoire had real growth of about 8% a year from 1960-1970 (Ridler 1985).
This growth record was unusual in Sub-Saharan Africa at that moment and this
led some observers to qualify this performance as a miracle (the ‘ivoirian miracle’)
(IBRD 1970).
Three types of factors facilitated the success of Cote d’Ivoire from 1960-1970.
The first relates to its political stability whereas neighboring countries have been
plagued with several coups d’e´tat. This fact helped to attract FDI and foreign
skilled labour that developed the manufacturing sector (Den Tuinder 1978). FDI
have also been encouraged by several tax advantages and import duties.
Second, the government implemented an outward development strategy which
was essentially based on the export of coffee and cocoa. For this purpose, a number
of policies were used to encourage the supply of these crops (Hecht 1983, Ridler 1985,
Lee 1980, Ridler 1988): price support and payment of bonuses to farmers; import
of cheap labour from the north of the country and neighboring countries (Burkina
Faso, Mali and Guinea); open rule and secured land tenure to immigrant farmers;
and a marketing and price stabilization system operated by the Caisse Nationale de
Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix Agricoles (CSSPPA). However, CSSPPA also
served for the extraction of rents which were used to invest in physical and human
capital (Azam 1993). Third, the prices of cocoa and coffee which were on a positive
trend before 1975, experienced a boom from 1976-1978, following Brazil’s frost in
July 1975.
Following this boom the government undertook excessive investment programs
in infrastructure and public enterprises. Similar unsustainable government spend-
ing occurred in many African countries during the commodity booms of the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s (Collier and Gunning 2008): Burundi (1972-1982); Cameroon
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(1970s, 1980s and 1990s); Congo (1978-1991); Guinea (1973-1984); Niger (1974-
1985); Nigeria (1970-1987); and Togo (1974-1974).
When the boom reversed in 1979 Cote d’Ivoire continued these programs with
external borrowing. However, many of these projects turned out to be unproductive
or took a long time to implement (Lee 1980, Davis 1983). One often mentioned
explanation of this mismanagement is the political system of Cote d’Ivoire which
was characterized by a single elite ruler, president Houphoue¨t-Boigny, who settled
a one-party system after the independence in 1960 and extracted state resources
to finance urban clientelism in order to keep his power. There were little controls
over government budget (Crook 1989, Campbell 2000, Hecht 1983). As such, debt
services climbed and a debt crisis emerged in 1980. Meanwhile Cote d’Ivoire faced
other imbalances (e.g. overvaluation of the currency, balance of payment crisis) and
all these contributed to a growth collapsed in the 1980s. To solve these problems a
number adjustment programs were initiated from 1981-1993, but these were not very
successful (Azam and Morrisson 1994, Berthelemy and Bourguignon 1996, Demery
1994). Cote d’Ivoire only renewed with balanced growth after an unprecedented
devaluation in 1994. However, this new growth process was interrupted by political
tensions that started in 1998. The tension led to a coup d’e´tat in 1999 and armed
conflicts from 2000-2012 that severely discouraged factor accumulation and induced
a misallocation of resources. All these events certainly explain why physical capital
is not significant and also the efficiency loss in Cote d’Ivoire as reported in Table 2.
4.2.3 Malawi
Another country that fares differently than the average is Malawi, for displaying
a positive efficiency component. Malawi is a small landlocked resource poor coun-
try. In the 1960s and 1970s Malawi had a stable and better growth performance
compared to other African landlocked counterparts such as Burundi and Rwanda
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but also its neighbors Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. This good performance
was the result of an outward development strategy based on tobacco, a cash crop,
and light manufacturing as in Cote d’Ivoire (World Bank 1981). Contrary to Cote
d’Ivoire, however, Malawi avoided a number of syndromes: state break-down, exces-
sive government intervention and overspending (Chipeta and Mkandawire 2008). In
the 1980s and early 1990s Malawi faced a number of adverse shocks which regressed
growth. These included a severe drought, oil price shocks, a pronounced reduction
in the number of Malawian working in mining in South Africa (which severely
reduced remittances), and an increase in transaction costs through Mozambique
(which has access to the sea), but experienced political problems in the period.
From the mid-1990s, Malawi renewed with a stable growth path following success-
ful structural and adjustment programs supported by the IMF and other donors
but also a number of reforms that strengthened domestic political institutions (IMF
2001). This achievement could well reflect our finding of the positive and significant
contribution of the efficiency component in Malawi (see column 3 of Table 2). This
growth performance improved further since the early 2000 following the successful
implementation of a number of poverty reduction programs. In particular, Malawi
is currently a net food exporter in contrast to its earlier years of food insecurity.
This performance contrasts with other landlocked countries such as Niger, Burundi,
and Rwanda that performed poorly. One thing that these countries have in com-
mon is the recurrent occurrence of civil wars and armed conflicts that have severely
constrained their economic development (Collier and O’Connell 2008).
4.2.4 Botswana
Among the remaining seven individuals that differ from the average, Botswana dis-
plays the largest labour productivity growth and has also been cited as a successful
story (Acemoglu et al. 2002). Botswana is a resource-rich country, a feature that
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increases the likelihood of political instability and arms conflicts as they have oc-
curred in many cases in Africa – including Sierra Leone and Zambia (Collier and
O’Connell 2008). However, Botswana avoided these syndromes thanks to good po-
litical institutions that enhance power sharing and political accountability, secure
property rights and encourage contracts (Maipose and Matsheka 2008). Moreover,
Botswana is well known for its Budget Sustainable Index (BSI) which imposes dis-
cipline on government budget management. These factors probably explain why
physical capital has contributed to growth in Botswana.
4.2.5 Mali
The remaining countries with significant physical capital are: Mali, Liberia, Sudan,
Egypt, Lesotho, Sudan, and Swaziland. Apart from Egypt, these countries were
much poorer in the 1960s and 1970s, with very small levels of capital. Moreover,
they have experienced either armed conflicts, civil wars and/or political instability.
When their political situation improved, their governance improved as well, which
probably helped to attract some FDI in their mining sectors.
Whereas political instability and excessive government intervention and misman-
agement retarded growth in Mali before from 1960-1980, the country experienced
stable growth from 1994-2007 thanks to successful structural and political reforms.
Moreover, Mali discovered important gold reserves in the 1990s which helped to
attract FDI (Coulibaly 2008). In the same way, Sudan has performed poorly in the
1970s and 1980s because of civil wars and bad governance. In the mid 1990s, the
situation improved and the country also discovered large oil and natural gas which
then attracted FDI that contributed to the domestic capital stock.
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4.2.6 Liberia
The experience of Liberia is, however, different. Liberia experienced a huge econ-
omy collapsed following a series of armed conflicts from 1979-2003. To rebuild the
country donors massively contributed to several projects to rebuild the capital stock
and invest in human capital as well as providing technical assistance to reshape the
institutions. The improvement of the political climate also encouraged FDI in the
mining sector (Werker and Beganovic 2011). These factors have thus helped to
rebuild the capital stock (per worker) which was estimated to be much higher in
2007 compared to its level in 1970 (2015.15 versus 647 although it reached a peak
of 7531.75 in 1983). It is probably this trend that our result is capturing.
4.2.7 Lesotho and Mozambique
Finally, it is also interesting to see losers in terms of human capital accumula-
tion. Only two countries have insignificant HACC terms. Specifically, Lesotho and
Mozambique have small positive, but insignificant components (see the last column
of Table 2). This result may reflect the damaging effect that HIV has had on hu-
man capital development in these countries (Channing 2006). Note, however, that
the result for Mozambique may primarily reflect the huge loss in human capital
following the independence war (1964-1974) as well as the civil war (1976-1992)
that devastated the country from 1964-1992 (de Sousa and Sulemane 2008). In
particular, the literature reports strong negative long-term effects of these wars on
school enrollments in Mozambique (e.g. Domingues 2011, UNESCO 2010). Civil
wars in other African countries certainty also impacted negatively on their school
enrollments. However, the average years of schooling data displays an unusual dy-
namic for Mozambique, stagnating around 1 from 1965-1970, decreasing to 0.95 in
1975 and standing at 1.81 in 2010. The data on school enrollment shows a strong
positive trend in other countries that experienced wars in the region. Moreover, the
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1-1.81 Mozambican average years of schooling increase from 1970-2010 is markedly
lower than the 1.05-3.94 average gain in other countries (Cote d’Ivoire, 1.26-4.60;
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1.16-3.26; Liberia, 1.14-5.11; Rwanda, 1.16-3.96;
Sierra Leone, 0.87-3.42; Sudan, 0.73-3.3) that had war and from armed conflicts in
the region. It is probably these different dynamics in years of schooling that our
estimates are capturing. The difference in years of schooling between Mozambique
and those countries are likely due to the differences in intensity and the duration
of wars but also to different post-conflict policies and institutional environments.14
4.3 Sub-Period Analysis
Because the long-term results presented in Table 2 and discussed above may be-
lie various important growth patterns over almost 40 years, we have carried out
the above calculations for each ten-year interval in our sample. Table 3 shows
the average results for 4 time intervals: 1970−1979, 1980−1989, 1990−1999, and
2000−2007.15
Those familiar with the African growth experience will immediately recognize
the inverted U-shape that features its historical growth (Berthelemy and So¨derling
2001, Ndulu and O’Connell 1999, 2009): the highest productivity growth in the
(1960s and) 1970s, the slowed and collapsed growth of the 1980s and (early) 1990s,
the recovery of the late 1990s, and the steady growth of the 2000s.
Our quadripartite decomposition shows that human capital accumulation is the
only positive and significant contributor to the average productivity growth through
14See Guariso and Verpoorten (2014) for a recent survey on different channels through which armed
conflicts impact education.
15Note that in each of the these time intervals, the assumption that technological regress is pre-
cluded has been maintained; for example in the 1990−1999 analysis, the countries have an access
to technologies defined by observations back to the 1970s.
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the sub-periods. In each of the time intervals, except for the 1970s, its value has
been the largest positive and absolute terms. The remaining three factors have been
either detrimental or non existent (see Table 3). For instance, in all periods, except
for the 2000s, deterioration in efficiency has been statistically significant, precluding
productivity from growing. The 1970s appear to have set the technological bar for
the African countries for decades to come.16 Yet, the contribution from technological
change at the beginning is rather small in magnitude and is it not statistically
significant. However, one needs to be careful here. Those who visit Africa see the
speed and the scale with which new technologies such as computers and cell phones
reach the continent. Data limitation (in the time dimension) may be the reason
why our analysis is not able to capture these effects. We plan to investigate this
point in our future research.
Note that the results (in Tables 2 and 3) suggesting the absence of technolog-
ical progress may also capture the failed diffusion of technological advances from
rich countries to Africa. Several factors are possible.17 First, the new knowledge
and technologies found in rich countries do not simply disseminate widely in Africa
because of a lack of basic infrastructure such as electronic (or other) access to sci-
entific (international) journals. Second, even if African countries are aware of new
technologies, they may not be able to use them because the new technology may
require a combination of human and physical capital that are not available in these
countries. In particular, because firms in the region rarely perform even basic re-
search and applied research and development, they will find it difficult to use capital
intensive technologies. Limited access to high power electricity that characterizes
many African countries is another constraint for capital intensive technologies (e.g.,
16Note the averages for 1970−1979 and 1970−2007 are roughly identical.
17We would like to thank a referee for drawing our attention to this point. See also Weil (2008)
for a discussion on the possible explanations of a lack of technology transfer from rich to poor
countries.
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magnetic levitation trains). Third and finally, African countries may not be able to
use technologies developed in rich countries because they lack tacit knowledge.
The simple average of physical capital accumulation is statistically significant
only in the 1970s. When we, however, consider a weighted average (see Zelenyuk
2011), the component is smaller and becomes insignificant. This implies that the
relatively smaller economies have benefited more from capital deepening and that
this component has been insignificant for the relatively larger economies. The 1970s
appear to be the only time interval where capital accumulation component shows
any sign of significance, which has also driven the overall long-term results. The
influence of the accumulation of capital has picked up in the 2000s, but it is still
insignificant.
The poor African growth performance of the 1980s and early-1990s thus coin-
cided with slow capital accumulation, efficiency losses and stagnant technological
progress. This finding is consistent with studies that employ standard growth ac-
counting (Berthelemy and So¨derling 2001, Ndulu and O’Connell 1999, 2009). How-
ever, we show that only the result related to efficiency is significant (technological
change is insignificant). In the same way, the recovery and steady African growth
of the mid-1990s and 2000s coincided with improvement in efficiency and capital
accumulation.
These decade-wise results confirm the long-term tendencies that we have un-
veiled in the previous sections. The rather modest productivity growth has been
largely driven by human capital accumulation, whereas the inability to catch-up
with technological change was the major impediment to productivity growth. The
contribution of the physical capital accumulation has proved to be a statistically
insignificant factor.
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4.4 Other Regions of the World
Our analysis has shown that capital accumulation was not on average a significant
force behind the productivity growth in Africa. As a robustness check, we perform
the same analysis for other groups that are homogeneous in either their geographical
proximity or economic relation. Table 4 presents the simple and weighted average
for the same time period, 1970−2007, for OECD, Latin American, Asian and East
Asian economies.
All the components of the decomposition are statistically significant for OECD
economies. Capital deepening is easily the largest determinant of the productivity
growth, that amounts to approximately 2% in annual terms. We further note that
OECD is the only group whose productivity has profited from technological changes.
The inability to catch up was also a statistically significant hindrance to produc-
tivity growth for the Latin American countries. They have significantly benefited
from human capital accumulation. Similar to the 1970s analysis of the African
economies, physical capital accumulation has significantly helped Latin American
economies grow. However, once we weight it by the size of the economy, the capital
accumulation component gets smaller and is statistically insignificant.
Over 1970−2007, the pace of productivity growth of the Asian and especially
the East Asian economies has been the largest in the world. Whether we consider
a simple or weighted average, physical capital accumulation is (by the factor of
at least ten) the largest driver of such grand growth. Asian countries have also
statistically significantly benefited from both efficiency change and human capital
accumulation.
In summary, the results show that physical capital accumulation is a large and
significant contributor to productivity growth elsewhere, but not in Africa.
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5 Conclusion
Studying growth patterns and determinants of African economies is essential for
understanding what can be done to reduce the gap between the performance of the
continent and the rest of the world. Using bootstrap methods originally designed for
Malmquist indices, we introduce statistical inference into the quadripartite decom-
position of labor productivity growth developed by HR to analyze the components
of growth in Africa. The results identify human capital accumulation as a major
and the only positive and significant (in a statistical sense) driving force behind la-
bor productivity growth in Africa. The study also shows that productivity growth
is significantly hampered by efficiency losses. Technological change is nonexistent in
the sample. Finally, and most importantly, ignoring statistical inference would lead
us to falsely conclude that physical capital accumulation is a major economic engine
in Africa when it is not. Further analysis shows that physical capital accumulation
is an important growth factor, and for Asian countries, is the primary contributor
to productivity growth.
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Table 2: Productivity and Statistical Significance of the Percentage
Contributions to Labor Productivity Change in African Countries,
1970−2007 (∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ implies significance at 1%/5%/10% level)
# Country Productivity (EFF − 1) (TECH − 1) (KACC − 1) (HACC − 1)
change ×100 ×100 ×100 ×100
1 Algeria −14.49 -74.89*** 4.40 3.51 215.17***
2 Benin 23.52 -32.62*** 0.00 22.73 49.38***
3 Botswana 579.91 0.01 3.34 143.08*** 170.64***
4 Burundi −23.15 -73.62*** 0.00 149.14 16.92***
5 Cameroon 50.61 -43.99*** 0.00 64.19 63.78***
6 Central African
Republic
−29.44 -47.11*** 0.00 -11.76 51.2***
7 Congo 60.70 -19.21** 0.00 27.15 56.44***
8 Cote d’Ivoire −7.20 -28.29*** 0.00 -0.94 30.64***
9 Egypt 164.72 -24.51** 0.00 61.48* 117.15***
10 Gabon 1.74 -63.59*** 0.00 33.79 108.84***
11 Gambia 2.74 -59.38*** 0.00 71.17 47.78***
12 Ghana 20.87 -5.53 0.00 -17.29 54.69***
13 Kenya 7.45 -39.79*** 0.00 4.87 70.16***
14 Lesotho 180.57 -34.1*** 0.00 261.4* 17.81
15 Liberia −78.52 -91.71*** 0.00 82.78* 41.7***
16 Malawi 134.71 42.14** 0.00 5.71 56.2***
17 Mali 110.75 -8.64 0.00 89.47* 21.75***
18 Mauritania 21.15 -37.68*** 0.00 42.06 36.85***
19 Mauritius 214.61 73.75*** 6.77 22.26* 38.72***
20 Morocco 40.11 -49.32*** 8.07 32.95 92.41***
21 Mozambique 89.87 2.02 0.00 80.34 3.2
22 Namibia 14.86 -40.17*** 5.58 12.54 61.6***
23 Niger −34.84 -51.33*** 0.00 15.21 16.21***
24 Rwanda −2.83 -67.05*** 0.00 132.89 26.61***
25 Senegal −6.88 -57.97*** 0.00 66.99 32.67***
26 Sierra Leone −25.18 -48.8*** 0.00 9.51 33.44***
27 South Africa 29.82 -31.37*** 5.06 9.17 64.93***
28 Sudan 88.98 -72.32*** 4.14 392.22* 33.21***
29 Swaziland 198.25 -62.61*** 2.15 406.36* 54.24***
30 Tanzania 56.00 -36.55*** 0.00 95.49 25.77***
31 Togo −34.69 -64.78*** 0.00 5.92 75.07***
32 Tunisia 139.61 -21.47 7.36 7.82 163.59***
33 Uganda 12.41 -42.08*** 0.00 41.84 36.84***
34 Zambia −32.52 -45.49*** 2.58 -11.72 36.7**
35 Zimbabwe −57.92 -79.11*** 3.99 5.06 84.36***
36 Average 54.18 -38.21*** 1.53 67.35 60.19***
37 Weighted Average 68.91 -36.28*** 3.07 47.55 92.48***
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Table 3: Mean and Weighted Mean of Productivity and Percentage
Contributions to Labor Productivity Change in Africa (∗∗∗/∗∗/∗
implies significance at 1%/5%/10% level)
Period Statistic Productivity (EFF − 1) (TECH − 1) (KACC − 1) (HACC − 1)
change ×100 ×100 ×100 ×100
1970−1979
Average 20.84 -22.41*** 1.80 45.5*** 13.69***
Weighted
Average
16.37 -17.45* 4.12 22.22 16.26***
1980−1989
Average 5.78 -9.13*** 0 1.9 15.15***
Weighted
Average
8.83 -12.77*** 0 0.68 25.21***
1990−1999
Average −1.06 -8.43*** 0 -1.46 10.85***
Weighted
Average
2.85 -8.62** 0 -0.51 14.24***
2000−2007
Average 13.04 -0.64 0 5.85 7.52***
Weighted
Average
17.19 0.41 0 8.38 8.16***
1970−2007
Average 54.18 -38.21*** 1.53 67.35 60.19***
Weighted
Average
68.91 -36.28*** 3.07 47.55 92.48***
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Table 4: Mean and Weighted Mean of Productivity and Percentage
Contributions to Labor Productivity Change by Groups, 1970−2007
(∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ implies significance at 1%/5%/10% level)
Group Statistic Productivity (EFF − 1) (TECH − 1) (KACC − 1) (HACC − 1)
change ×100 ×100 ×100 ×100
OECD§
Average 100.42 -11.97*** 17.77*** 71.64*** 15.33***
Weighted
Average
89.96 -15.98*** 14.64** 78.61*** 12.12***
Americas†
Average 22.78 -22.3*** 5.14 33.63*** 14.21***
Weighted
Average
24.90 -19.37*** 5.64 28.66 14.32***
Asia‡
Average 231.28 2.36* 7.34 159.79** 18.45***
Weighted
Average
589.43 15.85*** 6.80 367.82*** 16.61***
East Asia¶
Average 409.93 2.69*** 44.45 191.81* 22.99***
Weighted
Average
739.69 37.67*** 28.85 320.41*** 14.78***
§ (OECD as of 1970) Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
† Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
‡ Bangladesh, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan,
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Taiwan, Thailand
¶ China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand
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